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Introduction 
Mozambique has been included in the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience 
(PPCR), a flagship component of the Climate Investment Funds (CIF) managed by 
the World Bank along with other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). 
PPCR’s declared aim is to help poor countries to make the strategic investments 
needed to deal with the challenge of climate change and to “catalyze a 
transformational shift” that can “strengthen capacities at the national levels to 
integrate climate resilience into development planning” (CIF 2009a, p. 1). PPCR 
initiatives are designed to operate in two phases, with Phase 1 consisting of a 3-
18 month period of preparatory work culminating in the preparation of a 
“Strategic Program for Climate Resilience” (SPCR) and Phase 2 consisting of a 
period of up to five years in which this plan will be implemented through a mix 
of grant- and loan-funded investments.  
 
This report examines the process of prioritising investments under Phase 1 of 
the PPCR in Mozambique, which is still under way at the time of writing. It asks 
to what extent the process to date has demonstrated the “country ownership” 
and “broad participation” that PPCR claims to promote, in the light of the 
tensions that exist between different actors’ technical, institutional and political 
priorities.  
 
Institutional publicity materials from the Climate Investment Funds claim that 
the PPCR process “promotes a participatory approach for development of a 
broad-based strategy to achieving climate resilience at the national level in the 
medium and long-term” (CIF 2010: 1). The official CIF guidance stresses the 
importance of government leadership of design missions “in order to ensure a 
country-driven process, including broad participation that promotes country 
ownership of the PPCR program and its implementation as well as partnerships 
among the government, national stakeholders, and development partners” (CIF 
2009b: 4).  
 
However, the PPCR’s structure and processes establish a number of tensions 
between these aspirations and the political, institutional and economic realities 
and incentives associated with the programme. In particular, this study 
investigates three key areas of tension: 
 between global discourses emphasising technical decision-making and 
“partnerships among the government, national stakeholders, and 
development partners” and national decision-making processes driven by 
party-political calculation and characterised by pervasive mistrust; 
 between the logic of a “country-driven process” and the fact that the PPCR 
gives a key role to the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) in 
managing the programme and also privileges their existing projects as 
targets for additional funding; and 
 between the spirit of “broad participation” and the overriding goal of 
rapid disbursement of PPCR funds.  
 
 
 
This study was carried out as part of a research project on “Understanding the 
Political Economy of Low Carbon and Climate Resilient Development”, led by the 
Institute of Development Studies (IDS) and funded by the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) under the Learning Hub for Low Carbon and 
Climate Resilient Development. The project aims to “provide empirical analysis 
of how ideas, power and resources are conceptualised, negotiated and 
implemented at different scales in international climate change initiatives… 
[and] inform policy and programming on climate change and development 
through greater understanding and awareness of the political economy 
dimensions of climate change interventions” (IDS 2010: 3).  
 
To this end, the project employs a conceptual approach to political economy 
analysis that goes beyond conventional governance assessment to incorporate 
the role of ideas and ideology in the conceptualisation of climate policy 
interventions at both the global and national levels, in addition to analysis of 
national and subnational negotiation and implementation processes. The 
Mozambique case study followed this approach by combining different tools 
including discourse analysis, actor mapping and stakeholder analysis across a 
range of levels from the local to the global. The study took place between July 
and October 2010, with additional follow-up work between November 2010 and 
April 2011 and an update review in June 2011. It included individual and group 
interviews and stakeholder workshops in Maputo and Beira and face-to-face or 
telephone interviews with donor agency staff based in the UK and Madagascar, in 
addition to document analysis and background literature review work. 
 
The report begins with an outline of the key social, environmental, political and 
policy factors shaping the context in which PPCR is operating in Mozambique.  It 
then provides a brief description of the country’s engagement with the 
programme to the start of PPCR Phase 1. The next sections follow the overall 
study framework’s logic of sequentially analysing conceptualisation, negotiation 
and implementation. Section 3 examines the national and international 
discourses around climate change and the PPCR process, including broader 
aspects of “environmentalist” and “developmentalist” ideology as they influence 
debates in Mozambique. Section 4 examines some key issues in PPCR priority-
setting and the (formal and informal) decision-making processes and (explicit 
and implicit) criteria that have emerged around them during the Phase 1 
negotiations, focusing in particular on the themes of ownership and participation 
highlighted in the initial summary of global PPCR discourse. Section 5 focuses on 
actors, interests and power in the PPCR priority-setting process, and includes 
stakeholder analysis for both the national and subnational levels, with the latter 
focusing particularly on the possible inclusion of the opposition-controlled city 
of Beira in the coastal cities component of Mozambique’s PPCR. Section 6 
presents the study’s overall conclusions and recommendations. 
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1. Background: the social, environmental, political and policy 
context for climate change response in Mozambique  
Mozambique is not only one of the world’s poorest countries, but also has a level 
of vulnerability to drought, flood, sea level rise and increased frequency and 
severity of Tropical cyclones that makes it “one of the most exposed countries in 
the world to the cumulative effects of disaster risks and climate change” 
(Environment Working Group 2009: 1). Climate change response in the country 
is shaped by a number of key institutional, political and policy factors. In this 
section we review these contextual elements, before going on to describe the 
country’s engagement with the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR).  
 
1.1 Climate and socioeconomic context 
Mozambique is situated on the eastern coast of Southern Africa, between latitude 
10° 27’ and 26° 52’ South and longitude 30° 12’ and 40° 51’ East, with an Indian 
Ocean coastline of some 2,700 km. The country covers an area of about 799,380 
km², of which 786,380 km² is land and 13,000 km² is surface water. The climate 
of Mozambique is mostly tropical, characterized by two seasons: a cool and dry 
season from May to September, and a hot and humid season between October 
and April. The rainfall distribution in the country follows an east-west gradient, 
with more abundant rainfall along the coast, where the annual average varies 
between 800 and 1200 mm. The highest rainfall is in the coastal areas around 
the Central Region cities of Beira and Quelimane, while inland higher altitude 
areas in the north and central regions receive approximately 1000 mm, and the 
inland central and southern areas receive about 600 mm of rainfall. The south of 
Mozambique is generally drier, more so inland than towards the coast, with an 
average rainfall below 800 mm, decreasing to as little as 300 mm in Pafuri 
district, Gaza province (Macaringue, 2010).  
 
The 2007 Census estimated Mozambique’s population at 20 million inhabitants, 
with 62% living in rural areas (INE, 2008). The vast majority is still engaged in 
an essentially agrarian economy, including livestock, forestry and fisheries 
(Tibana, 1999). Agriculture accounts for 26% of GDP, while the share of industry 
(manufacturing, mining, construction, electricity and water) in GDP, having 
declined from 23% to 14% in the period between 1973 and the end of the armed 
conflict in 1992, has since recovered and reached 23.5% of GDP in 2003 (INE, 
2003). This recovery was fuelled mainly by large scale projects such as the 
Mozambique Aluminium smelter plant in Maputo, which began production in 
2000, and the development of the Inhambane natural gas fields by South Africa’s 
SASOL, which began exports by pipeline to South Africa in 2004. Such “mega-
investments”, along with foreign aid, have fuelled an impressive real GDP growth 
rate averaging 7.9% per year between 2001 and 2010.  
 
This growth initially seemed to be having an impact on the country’s extremely 
high poverty levels, with official figures showing a fall in the incidence of poverty 
from 69.4% in 1996-97 to 54.1% in 2002-03 (GoM, 2006). However, this 
progress may have been exaggerated by measurement issues, and even on the 
 
 
official measure, thanks to population growth the number of people living in 
poverty actually rose during the period (Hanlon 2010). The latest figures paint a 
still starker picture, with poverty rates actually increasing in several areas of the 
country (Francisco 2010). 
 
Around one third of Mozambique’s population is still food insecure, and rural 
households are exceptionally vulnerable to natural disasters, notably droughts, 
floods and cyclones. It is estimated that 60% of the population lives in coastal 
areas, and is therefore highly vulnerable to cyclones and storms. The country’s 
vulnerability to climate change has been attributed to its geographic location, 
including its long coastline and its position at the confluence of many 
international rivers flowing into the Indian Ocean (SADC 2000, article 6), as well 
as the extensive area of its land that lies below sea level, its high temperatures, 
aridity, infertile soils, many endemic diseases, lack of communications 
infrastructure, high level of illiteracy, high population growth rate, high levels of 
absolute poverty and high degree of dependence on natural resources that 
require predictable rain (Macaringue, 2010). 
 
1.2 Government, politics and donor relations 
Mozambique is a unitary state, in which provincial and district administrations 
are appointed by central government. The country is divided into 10 provinces 
plus Maputo (the capital city, which has provincial status), with 128 districts, 
which are in turn divided into administrative posts and localities. There are 43 
towns and cities that have the status of municipalities, including the 10 
provincial capitals. Unlike the Districts, the municipalities have elected local 
governments. Mozambique is undergoing a ‘decentralization and de-
concentration’ processes, with responsibilities increasingly delegated to both 
municipal authorities and districts. 
 
Since the country’s independence in 1975, Mozambique has been ruled by one 
party: the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, or Frelimo.1 With power forged 
in the experience of the ten-year liberation struggle, sustainable external support 
and a principle of not sharing power, Frelimo has maintained a politically stable 
government (Machili 1995, p. 389). The party has been able to manage internal 
political instability while maintaining its claim to legitimacy as a party of 
liberators, organizers and modernizers (Mazula 1995; Hanlon 1996; Sumich 
2005). Significantly, FRELIMO drafted the 1975 Constitution unilaterally, a rare 
case in the history of liberation movements in Africa where constitutional drafts 
were generally negotiated with colonial powers (Benoit 1981, p. 13-20). Again, 
when a new political settlement was needed to respond to the demands of the 
post-Cold War era and bring an end to the country's long civil war, Frelimo 
autonomously drafted and approved the 1990 Constitution which introduced 
multiparty democracy to the country (Santos and Trindade 2003).2 This period 
also demonstrated the party’s ability to reform, as Frelimo managed to adjust 
itself to dramatic politico-economic changes, through the process known as “four 
                                                        
1
 In 1977 FRELIMO ceased to be a movement and legally became a party. In this study we are 
referring to the role of the Frelimo Party and not to FRELIMO as a liberation movement. 
2
 Manning (2002, p. 19) reports study findings indicating that many people did not want a multiparty 
system because of fears that it could fuel another armed conflict between political leaders. 
 
 
shock therapy”, which included the transitions from central planning to a market 
economy, from emergency aid to economic development assistance, from war to 
peace and from a socialist single-party system to a democratic multi-party 
system (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995, p. 3-7). 
 
Frelimo has also acquired a deep reservoir of experience in handling external 
support, on which it has depended since the 1960s, whether for meeting military 
objectives, for the reform of the political system and stabilisation or for 
economic reforms (Rolim et al. 2002). Despite the ideological and geo-strategic 
challenges of the Cold War, the regime handled the political external influences 
from the East and the West well, managing to keep friendly ties with 
governments on both sides (Hanlon and Smart 2008, p. 274). From the conflict 
and post-conflict emergency period and into the subsequent phase in which 
investment and economic growth has coexisted with persistent poverty, 
Mozambique has remained one of the world’s most heavily-aided countries. For 
the last 25 years around half of the Government Budget has depended on foreign 
aid, rising to a peak of 60.4% in 2007.3 Between the mid-1990s and 2008 
Mozambique received an average of US$350 million per year in external aid 
(Hanlon and Smart 2008, p. 269).  
 
Mozambique is thus a “donor darling” whose elite has had to learn to negotiate a 
permanent situation of “contested sovereignty” (de Renzio and Hanlon 2007). 
However, the country may be starting on a pathway that finally allows it to move 
beyond this status, as the opening-up of its natural resources – including massive 
coal deposits in the central province of Tete and potential oil reserves off the 
coast of the northern province of Cabo Delgado – begins to provide significant 
new revenue streams for the government. These resources also help to explain 
the increased interest in Mozambique from “emerging power donors” including 
China, India and Brazil (as well as neighbouring South Africa), who Frelimo may 
see as a potentially less politically demanding source of external support, and 
thus a preferable alternative to the established (OECD-member) donor 
community.  
 
Despite the widely-hailed success of the country’s transition from brutal conflict 
to largely peaceful elections, the political process has recently become a focus of 
tensions between Frelimo and the established donor community.4 Frelimo has 
won every national poll held since the start of multi-party elections in 1994. In 
the four general and presidential elections, held in 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009, 
Frelimo secured both the post of President and a majority of seats in Parliament 
(De Brito 2009). Although opposition parties made some gains in the first rounds 
of municipal elections (held in 1998 and 2003), in the November 2008 municipal 
elections Frelimo won in 42 out of 43 municipalities. In the 2009 general and 
presidential elections, the treatment of the opposition Democratic Movement of 
Mozambique (Movimento Democrático de Moçambique, MDM) party became a 
                                                        
3
 Reported in Jornal Noticias, 2
nd
 November, 2007, after the budget revision by Parliament on 1
st
 
November 2007. 
4
 The success of electoral processes in Mozambique is generally referred to as the major contribution of 
aid to the country’s political stabilisation. All parties, and particularly the second main opposition party 
(the MDM), are funded from overseas sources (Africa Confidential, Fri 15
th
 May 2009, Vol. 50, p. 10; 
Hanlon 2002). 
 
 
key point of tension; anti-MDM manipulation of the electoral process was cited 
as one of the triggers for the temporary withholding of aid in 2010 that became 
known as the “donor strike” (Chichava 2010).  
 
The MDM’s Presidential candidate was Daviz Simango, who had also been the 
only politician to defeat both Frelimo and the main opposition party, Renamo, in 
the 2008 municipal elections. Those elections saw him winning re-election as the 
mayor of Mozambique’s second largest city, Beira, where he was initially elected 
in 2003 on a Renamo ticket, before deciding to leave the party and run as an 
independent when the Renamo leadership tried to stop him from running for re-
election. Observers note that the Mayor of Beira represents a unique political 
phenomenon in Mozambique, as his victory in 2008 represented the first time in 
the last three decades that a candidate who did not come from a military 
background had defeated the two most well-established political parties, Frelimo 
and Renamo. Simango set up the MDM just a few months before the 2009 
Presidential elections, and the party failed to overtake either Frelimo or Renamo. 
Nevertheless, it performed strongly in some key areas (including Maputo), and it 
was greeted by many political commentators and donor representatives as a 
significant new force with the potential to “introduce a new way of being and 
acting to Mozambique’s political scene” (Chichava 2010, p. 5). Since Beira is the 
principal power base of Daviz Simango and the MDM, this gives a particularly 
intense political significance to the debate over whether or not to include the city 
in Mozambique’s PPCR, one of the key issues examined in this report. 
 
1.3 Climate policy context 
The policy environment for PPCR in Mozambique is favourable, as evidenced by 
a range of legislation and the country’s positive response to the UNFCCC process 
(DFID 2009). Government policies, strategies and other official documents such 
as laws and funding agreements suggest that there is growing awareness of 
climate change issues, and some effort to mainstream them not only into the core 
national development policies but also into local government programmes. 
Climate change is referred to in core policy documents including both the 
current Five Year Government Plan (Plano Quinquenal do Governo, PQG 2010-
2014) and its predecessor, as well as Mozambique’s 2006-2009 PRSP (Plano de 
Acção para Redução da Pobreza Absoluta, PARPA II). 5 
 
However, climate change is still perceived as a relatively “new” issue, and policy 
is generally framed as a strictly environmental issue or else in the context of 
Disaster Risk Reduction, in which the country has already developed significant 
capacity. This is evident in key documents such as the 2007 National Adaptation 
Programme of Action (NAPA), the Institute of Disaster Management (Instituto 
Nacional de Gestão das Calamidades, INGC) Master Plan for 2006-2016 and the 
2007/08 Government Strategy for post-flood resettlement. The INGC, the main 
government coordination unit for humanitarian response, is a key implementing 
agency for practical mitigation and adaptation interventions through its 
operational branch, the National Centre for Emergency Operations (Centro 
                                                        
5
 At the time of the research the successor to PARPA II (for the 2011-2014 period) was still being 
negotiated by the Government of Mozambique and international donors. 
 
 
Nacional de Operações de Emergência, CENOE). One recent review notes that 
since the floods in 2000 and 2002 the agency has been playing a stronger and 
stronger role: 
INGC, the main player in this process, has been increasingly moving away 
from a reactive and logistical role, especially during response to disasters, 
to a more pro-active role in sustainable development processes.  This 
strategic change is evidenced by the increasing involvement of INGC in 
initiatives aiming at developing semi-arid and arid areas of the country 
such as the northern part of Gaza and Inhambane provinces. INGC 
recently created a specific department to develop and implement 
activities aimed at the development of dry areas where common staple 
crops such as maize, beans, and groundnuts cannot be produced. This is a 
clear move from a disaster response institution to anticipating and 
sometimes even reducing vulnerability of communities to disasters. 
(Macaringue 2010: 5) 
 
As this extract illustrates, the INGC is increasingly taking on roles and 
responsibilities that formally lie with the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministério da 
Agricultura, MINAG) or the Ministry for Cooordination of Environmental Actions 
(Ministério para Coordenação de Acção Ambiental, MICOA). Mozambique’s 
climate change response is hampered by a lack of clarity on the roles and 
responsibilities of different institutions and/or ministries that deal with climate 
change, with the Ministry for Planning and Development (Ministério da 
Planificação e Desenvolvimento, MPD) and MICOA both tasked with a 
coordination function and key sector ministries such as MINAG and powerful 
agencies such as INGC also expected to play leading roles (NAPA 2007, Chambote 
and Veja 2008). Given this lack of clarity, it is not surprising that despite the 
broadly favourable policy framework, a recent bilateral agency review concluded 
that climate change “is not yet fully integrated in policies” (DFID 2009, p. 2). 
Outside government the coordination problems are even more severe, as 
networking on climate change policy issues among civil society groups is 
virtually nonexistent. This is an issue to which we will return in the discussion of 
civil society participation in the PPCR in Section 4. 
 
Mozambique’s international partners also contribute to the lack of clarity, with 
different donor cluster groups and multilateral agencies attempting to play 
coordination roles in the climate policy arena, engaging with different 
government partners and encouraging the formation of multiple ‘coordination 
centres’ within the country. The donors’ Environment Working Group has acted 
as a key coordination forum at various times (including the international 
lobbying effort to ensure Mozambique’s inclusion in the PPCR, discussed in 
Section 2 below). However, the task of coordination seems to be becoming 
harder as different actors scramble to position themselves in the face of the 
arrival on the scene of major new climate change-related  funding, including the 
Japanese-funded and UNDP-managed Africa Adaptation Programme, and the 
PPCR itself. 
 
 
 
2. Process: Mozambique’s engagement with the PPCR 
Although Mozambique was included in the first wave of PPCR countries, at the 
time of this study the country had not yet completed the first phase of the 
process. According to the Climate Investment Funds (CIF) guidance, PPCR Phase 
1 is a pre-investment phase intended to include “analysis of climate risks, an 
institutional analysis, knowledge and awareness raising, key capacity building 
actions, and a consultative planning process to agree on a common vision and 
strategic approach for climate resilience and to define priority actions and 
investment needs to implement this approach” (CIF 2009a, p. 5). It is intended to 
last between 3 and 18 months, and establish the basis on which investments (a 
mix of loans and grants, up to an initially established limit of USD 100 million per 
PPCR country) will be made in Phase 2. This section gives an overview of the 
country’s engagement to date, in order to locate the issues of conceptualisation 
and negotiation discussed in sections 3 and 4. 
2.1 Initial engagements 
According to key informants interviewed during the research, Mozambique was 
not on the original list of pilot countries compiled by the CIF’s international 
“Expert Group”, but was included in the PPCR after vigorous lobbying. However, 
this lobbying was carried out by bilateral aid agencies, not by the Government of 
Mozambique itself. The agencies argued successfully that unlike the other 
African countries on the Expert Group’s list (Niger and Zambia), Mozambique’s 
climate resilience challenges included not only drought but also flooding, 
cyclones and sea level rise, and the PPCR would therefore deliver both greater 
impact and more broadly-applicable learning. 
 
Despite the emphasis on government leadership in the PPCR guidance, 
Government of Mozambique representatives interviewed during the study 
overwhelmingly described the initial process as externally-led, with donor 
agencies identifying the opportunity, setting the timetable and leading the 
activities. After the government formally accepted the invitation to participate in 
the PPCR in May 2009, both the initial scoping mission (July 2009) and the full 
joint mission (November-December 2009) that set in motion the preparation of 
Mozambique’s proposal were planned, designed and led by the World Bank and 
the African Development Bank (AfDB), the lead Multilateral Development Banks 
(MDBs) for Mozambique’s PPCR. The latter mission, in which the MDBs were 
supported by the UK Department for International Development and the UN 
Development Programme, effectively determined the content of Mozambique’s 
Phase 1 proposal (see AfDB/WBG/UNDP/DFID 2009). Although the mission was 
formally under the leadership of MICOA, the proposal itself was actually drafted 
by World Bank personnel  (see GoM 2010). 
2.2 PPCR Phase 1  
The PPCR is designed to pilot and demonstrate ways to mainstream climate risk 
and resilience into developing countries’ core development policies and 
planning. It is also meant to be a flexible programme to permit investments on 
the ground to active tangible results in areas where there is “readiness for 
implementation” (CIF 2009a). The PPCR Phase 1 proposal that resulted from the 
mission in November-December 2009 (GoM 2010) clearly demonstrated the 
importance of the latter aspect. It established that PPCR in Mozambique will be 
 
 
implemented by the GoM with the collaboration of the AfDB Group, the World 
Bank Group and with participation from the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other 
development partners. However, it clearly showed an intention to align 
investment with existing MDB projects rather than other sectoral or 
geographical priorities established by government planning processes, including 
the NAPA which MICOA had developed in 2007 (cf. PECB 2010, p. 35-36; NAPA 
2007, p. V; AfDB et al. 2009, p. 3). 
 
The Phase 1 document proposed to focus investment, capacity building and 
knowledge activities on: “i) transport and agriculture for mainstreaming climate 
change into budget and planning at central level, ii) tourism, ports, urban water 
and forests for the private sector because these sectors appear vulnerable to 
climate change, iii) agriculture, water management and transport in the Limpopo 
watershed and the Zambezi valley for the pilot investment in rural areas where 
the risks are floods and drought and iv) coastal protection and storm water 
drainage in one coastal town, possibly Beira, for the pilot investment in a coastal 
city where the main risk is sea inundation” (GoM 2010, p. 10). The indicative 
Phase 2 activities and costs were summarised in the table which is reproduced 
below. 
 
Table 1: PPCR proposed Phase 2 components 
Components Indicative Activities Estimated cost  
A. Climate resilient 
budget and planning at 
central and local level 
Adjusting public investment in the agriculture and 
transport sectors, MPD and line agency capacity 
building 
Building capacity in decentralized planning 
processes  
 
Some 5 million 
B. Climate resilient 
investments in agriculture, 
water  and roads in  2 rural 
poles 
Control of soil erosion and wildfire, 
soil conservation, small scale irrigation, water 
resource management, rural roads, hydromet 
stations 
Zambezi pilot pole: 
US$29 million 
Limpopo pilot pole: 
US$40 million 
C. Climate resilient  
investments in one costal 
city (Beira or other coastal 
city) 
Coastal erosion control, breakwater, storm water 
drainage  
Some US$23 million 
D. Initiatives for private 
sector  
Awareness, access to finance, demonstrational 
and pilot solutions, overall enabling environment 
Some US$18 million 
E. Project management project management, reporting monitoring and 
evaluation 
Some US$5 million 
Source – GoM 2010: 11 
 
These activities are intended to meet the following four key expected outcomes 
for Mozambique’s PPCR:  
a)  “integration of inclusive resilience into development plans” through  
      adjusting public investment programs in key sectors such as transport   
      and agriculture, and building the knowledge base for doing so in other  
      sectors; 
b) “increased consensus on approach to climate resilient development”  
     through “learning by doing” and sharing results on the ground in key  
     territorial areas, through enhanced knowledge and by building   
     awareness and stakeholder support for climate resilience in both the  
     private and the  public sectors; 
 
 
c) “Scaled up finance for climate resilient development” through supporting  
     resilience in selected poles where PPCR funding will significantly increase  
     the funding compared to baseline; 
d) “Improved coordination among stakeholders” through capacity building  
     support to improved inter-government and local government  
     coordination. (GoM 2010, pp. 10-12). 
 
In order to lay the foundations for achieving these outcomes in Phase 2, the 
Phase 1 proposal outlined a series of activities in line with the CIF guidance that 
this phase should focus on “analysis of climate risks, an institutional analysis, 
knowledge and awareness raising, key capacity building actions, and a 
consultative planning process to agree on a common vision and strategic 
approach for climate resilience and to define priority actions and investment 
needs to implement this approach” (CIF 2009a, p. 5). These activities, the prior 
work on which they would build and their tentative costs were summarised in 
the table which is reproduced below. 
 
Table 2: PPCR proposed Phase 1 activities: $1.5 million Total 
Tasks Already done Activities To be financed during phase 1 Tentative 
Costs 
Analysis of Climate 
Risks, Impacts and 
Needs 
INGC phase I, 
Extreme events 
study and EACC 
 
 Analysis of vulnerability in 4 
selected private sectors (urban 
water supply, ports, forestry, 
tourism) and related public sector 
institutions : Gaps and needs, 
priority initiatives and Investments  
300K 
Institutional 
Analysis 
African Adaptation 
Program –AAP- 
(UNDP) 
 Regional institutions mapping and 
expenditure analysis in the three 
poles 
240K 
Capacity Building 
and Preparation of 
the Strategic 
Program 
INGC phase II  Assessment of the 5 years 
government development plan 
climate vulnerability 
 Capacity building needs 
assessment (MPD, key line 
ministries and other actors) 
75K 
 
75K 
Consultation Process 
and preparation of a 
SESIA 
Technical meeting 
for the evaluation of 
the AAP (May 2009) 
Consultation for the 
formulation of INGC 
Phase 2 (June 2009) 
 PPCR Strategic Environmental and 
Social Impact Assessment  (SESIA) 
including  policy analysis in 2 
sectors, assessment of investments 
in pilot regions and consultation 
150K 
Knowledge and 
Awareness Raising 
INGC Phase 2  Socio economic analysis and 
vulnerability assessment in the 
Limpopo watershed and the 
Zambezi Valley 
 Vulnerability assessment of coastal 
cities 
260 K 
 
 
 
130K 
Definition of priority 
Action Needs, 
including 
Investments 
NAPA  Comparison of options for climate 
resilience investments with 
preliminary cost and benefits, once 
decision on districts and town is 
final 
270K 
Source – GoM 2010, p. 14 
 
 
 
Following a further mission in April 2010, the Phase 1 proposal was approved by 
the PPCR subcommittee of the CIF in June 2010. However, the Grant Agreement 
by which the Government of Mozambique formally consented to the startup of 
Phase 1 activities was only signed in November 2010, more than half-way 
through the period initially planned for this phase. This limited still further the 
scope for carrying out the extensive process of stakeholder consultation 
envisaged in the CIF guidance, as discussed in Section 3 below. 
3. Conceptualisation: rationales and discourses in 
Mozambique’s PPCR 
The official CIF programme summary claims that the PPCR process “promotes a 
participatory approach for development of a broad-based strategy to achieving 
climate resilience at the national level in the medium and long-term” (CIF 2010, 
p. 1). This section examines the extent to which the rationales and discourses 
associated with PPCR at the global level were in evidence among the actors 
concerned with the programme’s development in Mozambique. 
 
3.1 Global PPCR rationales and discourses 
PPCR is designed to “catalyze a transformational shift” that can “strengthen 
capacities at the national levels to integrate climate resilience into development 
planning” (CIF 2009a, p. 1). The CIF guidance stresses the importance of 
government leadership of design missions “in order to ensure a country-driven 
process, including broad participation that promotes country ownership of the 
PPCR program and its implementation as well as partnerships among the 
government, national stakeholders, and development partners” (CIF 2009b, p. 4). 
The PPCR programming document emphasises the need to “conduct regular 
consultations with relevant stakeholders, identified in a stakeholder analysis, 
throughout the PPCR process to ensure broad ownership” (CIF 2009a, p. 7).  
 
The rationale for PPCR therefore frames the search for a “transformational shift” 
towards climate resilience as centring on the issue of national development 
planning, and on multi-stakeholder engagement in the planning process. The 
programme’s global discourse on how this is to be achieved emphasises two key 
elements: country ownership and broad-based participation. However, it is less 
clear how these are to be ensured, especially given the tight timetable for the 
implementation of such an ambitious programme and the insistence that “PPCR 
funded actions should, as an overall practice, not be free-standing and should be 
blended with MDB resources and/or other parallel and co-financing” (CIF 2009a, 
p. 15). This provides strong incentives to direct resources towards existing MDB-
funded programmes – whether or not these resulted from the participatory 
construction of a “common vision of climate resilience in the medium and long 
term” (CIF 2009a, p. 2). 
 
3.2 Discourses among actors involved with PPCR in Mozambique 
Table 3 below summarises our analysis of the discourses used by key informants 
during interviews and/or by participants in the workshops organised during the 
fieldwork. These have been grouped according to whether they refer to framings 
 
 
of climate change, to the planning and policy process or to broader questions of 
values and ideology. 
 
Table 3: Discourses, elements and associated actors 
Discourse Elements Examples of actors using 
this discourse 
Climate change framings 
Technical Climate change is a complex 
environmental issue 
requiring data collection and 
modelling 
MICOA, INGC, some donors 
Disasters Climate change increases the 
frequency and intensity of 
disaster risks 
INGC, MICOA, government 
planning documents (PQG, 
PARPA, NAPA), donors 
(including DFID, UNDP) 
Livelihoods Climate change exacerbates 
poverty, intensifies 
vulnerability / uncertainty for 
the poor 
UNAC (speaking for small 
farmers), local NGOs and 
CBOs in Beira  
Process 
Managerialist  Instruments must follow 
established fiduciary 
standards; funds need to be 
disbursed quickly; more 
consultation risks delaying 
the process 
World Bank 
Policy dependency The policy agenda is set by 
donors’ priorities, though 
government reserves the 
right to control the political 
agenda 
Government of 
Mozambique officials (off 
the record) 
Politicisation Development goals are 
secondary to party-political 
goals; Frelimo/the 
government is intolerant of 
criticism; no trust exists for 
consultation 
NGOs, some donors and 
academics 
Participation-pessimist Civil society lacks capacity, is 
disorganised, is 
unrepresentative 
Government of 
Mozambique, academics, 
some NGOs themselves 
Action-oriented Mozambique already has too 
much planning / too many 
different plans; what is 
needed is action that actually 
makes a difference on the 
ground 
Government of 
Mozambique officials (off 
the record), some NGOs 
Broader ideology 
Developmentalist  Infrastructure investment as 
the key to development; 
natural resource extraction as 
a sovereign right (regardless 
of climate impact) 
Government of 
Mozambique, Beira 
municipal government, 
some NGOs  
Environmentalist  Natural resource Environmental NGOs: 
 
 
preservation; anti-pollution 
(e.g. campaign against Mozal 
aluminium smelter) 
Centro Terra Viva, Justiça 
Ambiental, others 
 
It is evident from the table that while key actors in Mozambique employ many 
different discourses in relation to climate change and development, and frame 
the challenges that PPCR seeks to address in different ways, there is little 
identification with the global PPCR discourses. In particular, none of them frame 
climate change as a cross-cutting issue (rather than an “environmental issue” or 
a “disaster risk issue”) that requires an overhaul of national development 
planning processes. In fact, several of the discourses around the policy and 
planning process run counter to the global PPCR discourses of “country 
ownership” and “stakeholder participation”, emphasising the donor-dependency 
of the policy agenda and the difficulty in establishing an effective dialogue given 
civil society’s issues of coordination and legitimacy and the lack of trust in the 
government – and even questioning the value of any investments in planning 
when the country has already produced so many studies, plans and reports and 
yet so little seems actually have changed in the lives and livelihoods of the most 
vulnerable Mozambican citizens.  
 
On the broader ideological front, there is a clearly dominant “developmentalist” 
approach which has support across government and beyond, including many 
civil society actors and “rising power” donors such as China, as well as sympathy 
from established donor agencies with a traditional emphasis on investment for 
economic growth (including the MDBs, despite the fact that their avowed 
intention to play a leading role in climate change mitigation and adaptation 
should incline them more towards helping Mozambique onto a low-carbon 
development path). This approach links the economic argument for 
infrastructure investment with the political argument that Mozambique has the 
sovereign right to exploit its natural resources in whatever way it chooses. Some 
actors also link this with the moral argument that as a country with a negligible 
historically-accumulated carbon footprint, Mozambique should not be held back 
from seeking to resolve its pressing social problems through economic growth 
by the inconvenient fact that its principal source of future revenue is likely to be 
the exploitation of its fossil fuel reserves. The civil society actors who voice the 
most explicit challenge to this ideological standpoint are the Maputo-based 
environmental NGOs, who during the study period were engaged in a fierce war 
of words with MICOA over what they saw as the latter’s complicity in allowing 
the persistence of illegally high pollution emissions from the Mozal aluminium 
smelter. In a setting with already low levels of trust between government and 
civil society, this ideological clash raises additional obstacles to establishing 
“partnerships among the government, national stakeholders, and development 
partners” in a PPCR process that the government locates firmly within the 
environmental policy arena, as discussed in the next section. 
 
 
4. Negotiation: “country ownership” and “stakeholder 
participation” in PPCR Phase 1 
In this section, we analyse some key issues and the (formal and informal) 
decision-making processes and (explicit and implicit) criteria that have emerged 
around them during the PPCR Phase 1 negotiations. We focus in particular on the 
themes of ownership and participation identified in the analysis of global PPCR 
discourse in Section 3. These themes are analysed in relation to three specific 
elements of the PPCR process: the choice of lead Government of Mozambique 
ministry for the programme, the identification of a pilot municipality for the 
PPCR’s coastal cities component and the experience of civil society organisations 
in engaging (or finding themselves unable to engage) with PPCR. 
 
4.1 “Country ownership” 1: choosing a lead Ministry 
As noted in the previous section, prevailing government discourses in 
Mozambique frame climate change either as an environmental issue or as one of 
disaster preparedness. Given the stated intention of building on UNFCCC 
agreements and the National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA), on which 
the Environment Ministry (MICOA) had led, the Government of Mozambique 
made it clear that it wished its inputs to the PPCR process to be coordinated by 
MICOA. However, this was overruled by the international agencies driving the 
process (led by the World Bank).  
 
The reasons given for this were both practical and strategic. Practically, the 
World Bank had already established a management unit in the Planning Ministry 
(MPD) that was capable of fulfilling its fiduciary requirements and could 
therefore enable disbursements to begin more rapidly. Strategically, placing the 
project under the MPD would be more consistent with the overall aims of the 
PPCR, which seeks to “catalyze a transformational shift” that can “strengthen 
capacities at the national levels to integrate climate resilience into development 
planning” (CIF 2009a, p. 1).  
 
Given the government’s continued insistence that MICOA should lead, in the 
event the PPCR Phase 1 proposal described the option for the MPD as “a 
transition arrangement for Phase I only to allow for a rapid signature and 
implementation of the grant” and stated that “the strategic technical oversight 
role would be assumed by an inter-ministerial council co-chaired by MPD and 
MICOA” (GoM 2010, p. 14). Following further pressure from the MDBs, the 
Government of Mozambique responded by designating not one but two focal 
points: one representative of MICOA and one of the MPD. 
 
Despite its description of the MPD role as a “transition arrangement”, the 
management plan made no mention of any efforts to develop an alternative 
implementation unit during the course of Phase 1. Thus, while the issue of which 
Ministry would ultimately lead was left formally open, it was clearly established 
that the PPCR money itself would flow through the MDBs’ preferred channel.  
 
At the time of the fieldwork there was an expectation among key informants that 
the senior specialist who had led for MICOA in the initial discussions would be 
 
 
recruited into a project implementation unit in the MPD, in order to provide at 
least an informal MICOA presence at the heart of a PPCR process that would be 
led by the MPD. However, he was subsequently taken off the PPCR case and 
transferred outside Maputo by MICOA. Instead of choosing a Technical 
Coordinator from either MICOA or the MPD, the MDBs hired a (non-
Mozambican) consultant to support coordination of inputs to the Phase 2 
proposal. In the absence of a formal home for the project implementation unit in 
either ministry, at the time of writing he was still based “provisionally” in the 
World Bank office. 
 
4.2 “Country ownership” 2: Beira and the coastal cities component  
As summarised in Table 1, the list of priorities identified in Mozambique’s PPCR 
Phase 1 proposal covers responses to cyclones, drought and flood. It includes 
investments to support resilience in the face of cyclones in one coastal city, as 
well as of drought in the Limpopo valley and flooding in the Zambezi valley, in 
addition to the “climate resilient budget and planning at central and local level” 
that is supposed to be the programme’s principal raison d’être, and work with 
the private sector (to be led by the World Bank’s private sector financing arm, 
the IFC) described as “awareness, access to finance, demonstrational and pilot 
solutions, overall enabling environment” (GoM 2010, p. 11).  
 
While this list covers what are agreed to be the three major categories of climate 
risk raced by Mozambique, the actual locations of the pilot projects demonstrate 
the power of MDB preferences in shaping PPCR investments. It rapidly became 
clear during the case study research that the Limpopo and Zambezi pilots had 
been chosen primarily because they were the locations of ongoing investments 
by the MDBs.6 This is entirely consistent with the guidance that “PPCR funded 
actions should, as an overall practice, not be free-standing and should be blended 
with MDB resources and/or other parallel and co-financing” (CIF 2009a, p. 15). 
However, it is hard to see any evidence of “country ownership” in this selection. 
These existing MDB projects had, of course, been agreed with the Government of 
Mozambique – but not as part of any nationally-directed process designed to 
strengthen the country’s climate resilience. The Limpopo region is indeed 
vulnerable to drought and the Zambezi to flooding, but neither was identified in 
Mozambique’s NAPA as being the most critical area for either category of risk 
(MICOA 2007). 
 
However, while the locations of the pilots for the drought and flood resilience 
components of Mozambique’s PPCR Phase 1 proposal seem to reflect MDB 
priorities rather than national ones, the case of the coastal cities component is 
much less clear-cut. Mozambique’s NAPA includes protection against coastal 
erosion as a priority, but does not mention specific risks affecting urban areas in 
the coastal zone. However, the thorough study of climate-related disaster risks 
carried out by the INGC did include detailed consideration of the potential 
impacts on key cities, including Maputo and Beira (INGC 2009, p. 11-12).  
                                                        
6
 The African Development Bank is supporting irrigated agriculture around the Massingir Dam on a 
tributary of the Limpopo, and the World Bank is supporting “market-oriented smallholder 
development” in the Zambezi Valley. 
 
 
 
Rather than an existing programme, the MDB interest in the case of the coastal 
cities component was to use PPCR resources to support a new one: in this case, a 
proposed World Bank urban infrastructure programme which would have as its 
preferred focus the city of Beira. However, this interest came up against the 
reluctance of the Frelimo government to channel resources to a city that is seen 
as an opposition stronghold – however great its economic significance and 
however vulnerable it might be to climate change. 
 
Beira is home to a vibrant culture of political contestation that sets it apart from 
the rest of the country, and was a focal point of Mozambique’s long and bitter 
civil war between 1977 and 1992. The city is also a major and strategically 
significant port, providing access to the sea for landlocked Zimbabwe and an 
export route for the massive coal deposits in the Mozambican interior that are 
currently being opened up by transnational mining companies. With over half a 
million inhabitants living just a few feet above the level of the Indian Ocean, 
protected only by decaying sea defences, eroding dunes and a rapidly-
disappearing belt of mangroves, Beira is also one of the places in Mozambique 
that is most critically threatened by sea level rise and the increasing frequency 
and intensity of cyclones (INGC 2009). This should make it a natural candidate 
for inclusion in Mozambique’s PPCR. However, the decision to allocate several 
million dollars’ worth of international climate change finance to a city controlled 
by one of the most important opposition leaders was never going to be an easy 
one for Frelimo, accustomed as the party is to exercising unquestioned control 
over the levers of political and economic power in Mozambique. 
 
The Aide Memoire which records the conclusions of the initial PPCR Mission to 
Mozambique clearly proposed “climate resilient coastal, transport and urban 
infrastructure protection at Beira” (AfDB/WBG/UNDP/DFID 2009, p. 4). 
However, by the time Mozambique came to submit its Phase 1 proposal, the 
unequivocal option for Beira had metamorphosed into “climate resilient  
investments in one coastal city (Beira or other coastal city)” (GoM 2010, p. 11). 
The document’s detailed discussion of the proposed PPCR coastal cities 
component managed to combine redefining the choice of city as an open multi-
option process with signalling a continued preference for Beira: 
The PPCR phase 1 preparation grant would support development of 
climate resilience investment options and an investment plan for the 
preferred option, together with longer term resilience strategies for the 
city of Beira. Depending on government priorities other cities may also be 
selected. (ibid, p. 37) 
 
A senior Government of Mozambique representative interviewed during the 
fieldwork confirmed that Beira was the preferred option, and stated that it 
would end up receiving the PPCR investments. When asked why, in that case, the 
Phase 1 proposal did not simply make this clear instead of proposing that an 
expensive and time-consuming sequence of consultancies and discussions would 
be undertaken before the preferred option was officially decided, he simply 
replied “it is political” (key informant interview, Maputo, 15 July 2010).  
 
 
The government’s position of neither confirming nor denying that Beira will 
receive the funds can be interpreted as a warning to the MDBs and donors that 
they should not take its acquiescence for granted when party-political issues are 
at stake. It is widely assumed that Mayor Daviz Simango enjoys the support of a 
significant proportion of the donor community, contributing to accusations that 
his party, the MDM, has been “more inclined to look abroad [for guidance] than 
to Mozambique” (Chichava 2010, p. 14). In the wake of the “donor strike”, itself 
provoked by foreign anger at Frelimo’s treatment of the MDM, the government 
had a powerful incentive to assert “country ownership” of at least this part of the 
PPCR process.  
 
Significantly, however, it chose to focus on the one PPCR component where the 
technical case for the identified investment priorities was strong, given the well-
documented economic importance and climate vulnerability of Beira. For the 
drought and flood resilience components, the government ignored the lack of fit 
between the MDBs’ preferred pilot sites and the priority locations identified in 
its own climate analysis, including the NAPA. It seems that neither the Limpopo 
nor the Zambezi regions raises party-political issues in the same way that Beira 
under Daviz Simango does, and therefore that in these cases there was less 
incentive for the government to invoke the principle of “country ownership”. 
 
4.3 “Broad Participation”? Civil Society Engagement in PPCR Phase 1 
The PPCR guidance states that Phase 1 should “ensure a socially inclusive 
process during consultations to provide inputs from a wide range of actors, such 
as NGOs and other civil society groups, specifically vulnerable groups, academe, 
and the private sector” (CIF 2009a, p. 6). From the interviews carried out during 
fieldwork, it became evident that there was no sense among civil society 
organisations (CSOs) of having been engaged in the PPCR Phase 1 process. This 
was the case even among those interviewees whose organisations were listed in 
the PPCR documentation as having been consulted, one of whom insisted “we 
now know about PPCR because you are interviewing us and not because the 
Government or the MDBs shared this with CSOs” (interview, Maputo, 27 July 
2010).  
 
The lack of consultation was not regarded as surprising; interviewees stated that 
CSOs rarely have access to processes controlled by the government and MDBs, 
and the PPCR process was seen as just another illustrative example of this 
tendency. Where CSOs are invited to engage in consultative fora linked to such 
processes, they are often left feeling that their attendance is merely to make up 
the numbers or “provide signatures on an attendance list that legitimates the 
event” (interview, Maputo, 13 July 2010). There is also a sense of participation 
fatigue, resulting from a perception that consultations are just a “populist” 
process of legitimisation of official documents whereby people arrive to find that 
everything has been already decided. Where CSOs insist on going beyond this 
legitimation function they are perceived by the Government as a political 
opposition, and accused of seeking to undermine its plans or block development 
projects, as occurred with the confrontation over pollution from the Mozal 
aluminium smelter during the study period. 
 
 
 
CSO interviewees questioned the lack of public consultation on the PPCR 
process, particularly on the selection criteria for pilot areas as well as the 
allocation of funds among these areas. However, they described their lack of 
effective voice in the PPCR Phase 1 process as inevitable, given the weight of the 
political or socio-economic interests of the agencies leading the process 
(specifically for the Government of Mozambique in Beira, the country’s second 
most politically important city, the African Development Bank in the Limpopo 
basin and the World Bank in the Zambezi Valley). They asserted that CSOs in 
Mozambique needed to learn how to engage with this reality, by understanding 
the interests involved on the side of the Government and that of the MDBs.  
 
Several interviewees raised the issue of the lack of coordination and clarity on 
the government side as an obstacle for effective engagement, with one stating 
that  
There is a crisis of leadership in the environment sector... it suffers from 
it. There is no clarity in this agenda; no clear sign of willingness on the 
part of the government, if they cannot do it, at least to support CSOs to 
address the problem; no government strategy of communication about 
the NAPA and other documents on climate change” (interview, Maputo, 
27 July 2010).  
 
However, in individual interviews and workshop discussions in both Maputo and 
Beira, CSO representatives acknowledged that fragmentation and lack of 
coordination are problems on the civil society side as well as that of the 
government, and that the difficulties they face in engaging with climate change 
policy issues are due to capacity constraints as well as government resistance. 
One outcome of the project workshops was a commitment from CSO 
representatives to try to develop civil society climate change policy platforms to 
engage with PPCR both at the national level and in Sofala Province, where Beira 
is located. However, developing effective and sustainable civil society networks 
has proved a challenge in Mozambique, a resource-scarce context where most 
incentives are for NGOs to compete for donor funding rather than collaborating 
over strategies for engagement with the government and other powerful actors.  
 
The PPCR guidance emphasises “broad participation”, but it generally focuses on 
the role of such participation in promoting consent and buyin to a predefined 
programme, rather than on its potential contribution to shaping the programme 
itself. However, it does state that “specific attention should be given to ensuring 
that women, youth, indigenous peoples, local communities and other vulnerable 
social groups are consulted and their views on solutions to climate risks are 
considered” (CIF 2009a, p. 6-7). An example of such local “views on solutions to 
climate risks” was provided by NGO representatives and community members 
interviewed during our research in Beira, who emphasised the importance of 
restoring the mangrove forests that play a vital role in stabilising the coastline, 
as well as in supporting coastal ecosystems and the livelihoods that depend on 
them.7  
                                                        
7
 Beira’s critically vulnerable Praia Nova neighbourhood lost its mangroves during the civil war, when 
they were cut down by the military to prevent guerrillas from sheltering there, while mangrove forests 
on the city’s outskirts are rapidly being depleted by charcoal-burning. 
 
 
The PPCR is designed to make use of the technical studies that are currently 
under way in Beira (funded by the EU and the Japanese government, among 
others), but these focus overwhelmingly on the physical infrastructure of 
breakwaters and floodgates, which raises the risk that PPCR will adopt a bias 
towards heavy engineering solutions. While physical infrastructure investment 
is clearly necessary in Beira, and has lower transaction costs than would be the 
case with a dispersed programme of community-based restoration of mangroves 
and other coastal ecosystems, the former type of investment has other 
attractions, both for MDBs seeking to make fast and large-scale disbursements 
and for political elites who wish to control rent-seeking opportunities.  
 
The Mayor of Beira stressed his awareness of the need for engineering 
interventions to be balanced by mangrove restoration (as well as tree-planting 
for dune stabilisation), but he did not mention any role for civil society in this 
process (Daviz Simango interview, Beira, 14 July 2010). Local NGOs and 
community groups have been developing innovative strategies to protect and 
restore the mangrove forests, but those interviewed said that the MDB and 
government actors driving the PPCR process had made no effort to draw on their 
experience, and no Beira-based CSOs were contacted when the PPCR mission 
team visited the city.  
 
Although the PPCR Phase 1 proposal included “a strategic environmental and 
social impact assessment (SESIA) of the overall planned program, including 
alternatives in the three pilot poles, with consultations at the local level [that 
will] include CSOs and community groups, local and provincial, public and 
private stakeholders” (Government of Mozambique 2010, p. 13), MDB 
representatives interviewed during fieldwork stated that the SESIA was now 
planned to be a desk-based exercise. This withdrawal of even the limited 
consultation opportunities built into the proposal suggested that the PPCR Phase 
1 process was not likely to provide opportunities for its supposed local 
beneficiaries and other actors with in-depth local knowledge to contribute to 
shaping the programme before the Phase 2 investment decisions are made.  
 
When this issue was raised at a project workshop, the World Bank 
representative leading on the Mozambique PPCR recognised that civil society 
engagement in the process had been very limited and said he would support 
efforts by bilateral donors to strengthen this engagement – but insisted that 
limited participation was an inevitable tradeoff for the rapid disbursement on 
which many of those same donors had been insisting (Maputo workshop, 14 
October 2010). 
 
There is clearly a tension between the aspiration to promote “broad 
participation” and the MDBs’ internal and external pressures to ensure rapid 
project preparation, signoff and disbursement of funds. In addition, the study 
revealed a tension between the two stated PPCR principles of stakeholder 
participation and country ownership. When donor representatives expressed 
concern at the lack of civil society participation in Phase 1, MDB representatives 
insisted that promoting this participation was not their responsibility but the 
government’s, implying that to insist on broader participation would run counter 
to the principle of country (understood to mean government) ownership.  
 
 
After the donor representatives counter-argued that the learning and capacity 
development dimensions of the PPCR provided a justification for the MDBs, as de 
facto lead agencies for programme design, to play a leading role in promoting 
participation, the MDB representatives agreed to push for a more proactive 
approach. Following the appointment of the two Government of Mozambique 
focal points in April 2011, a series of consultations was indeed launched, and 
was planned to include multi-stakeholder meetings in Maputo and Beira as well 
as other potential project sites.  
While the study team were unable to accompany these consultation meetings or 
collect the perspectives of civil society participants, one donor representative 
commented in an e.mail exchange in early June that “the Consultation process 
has been useful as it has brought the Government’s attention to the need for 
involving in practice other sectors such as civil society and the private sector”. 
PPCR Phase 1 was in its final stages when this consultation exercise was 
launched, so it seems unlikely that participants were given the opportunity to 
propose significant changes to investment decisions; this would have disrupted 
the financial negotiations and technical studies that by this stage were already 
close to completion, ahead of the Phase 2 proposal submission scheduled for late 
June 2011 (see Section 5.3 below).   
 
4.4 Decision-making criteria 
This section has described a set of processes involving different decision-making 
criteria, whether explicit or implicit. These may be technical (e.g. climate risk and 
potential adaptation efficiency), institutional (e.g. fit with existing MDB projects 
and processes), economic (e.g. potential for linkage with strategic infrastructure 
investments) or political (e.g. ruling-party reluctance to channel resources to an 
opposition stronghold).  
 
One set of criteria that seems not to have featured in any of the decision-making 
processes associated with PPCR is the social impact of the proposed investments. 
Their potential for supporting more resilient livelihoods for small farmers living 
with drought or for fishing communities dependent on the productivity of the 
mangroves around Beira was never mentioned by anyone involved in the PPCR 
decision-making process. The words “poverty” or “poor” (let alone “gender” and 
“women”) were absent from the draft terms of reference for the “Strategic 
Environmental and Social Impact Assessment” included in the Phase 1 proposal, 
and the word “vulnerable” appeared only in relation to economic sectors, not 
people. This absence of poverty reduction criteria from the PPCR mirrors the 
lack of analysis of the links between poverty and climate change in the 
government’s own plans, including the five-year plan and the PRSP. 
 
This disconnect would seem to strengthen the case for the PPCR, with its 
commitment to the mainstreaming of resilience into national development 
planning, as a tool for helping to establish these links between climate and 
poverty reduction policy. Unfortunately, however, the evidence from the PPCR 
Phase 1 process thus far is that such links are unlikely to be strengthened by the 
programme, given the limited scope it has allowed for engagement by those 
stakeholders who are most closely concerned with the wellbeing of the poor. 
 
 
Ultimately, this lack of emphasis on the voices and interests of those 
Mozambican citizens who are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change is 
a result of the interplay of actors, interests and power in the PPCR process, 
which is the theme of the next section. 
5. Actors, interests and power 
The field of climate change policy in Mozambique involves many international as 
well as domestic actors. This section provides an overview of existing 
internationally-supported climate change policy initiatives, in order to set the 
PPCR in context. It goes on to examine the specific constellations of stakeholders 
and interests around PPCR priority-setting at two levels: the definition of the 
overall national programme and the specific issue of whether or not to include 
Beira in the coastal cities component. It concludes by reflecting on what role the 
power dynamics that have shaped Mozambique’s PPCR process thus far are 
likely to play in the implementation phase. 
 
5.1 Existing international engagements with climate change policy in 
Mozambique 
Key informants consulted during the case study research identified a large 
number of international actors engaged in supporting the Government of 
Mozambique on climate change issues. The most influential multilateral actors 
were identified as AfDB, the Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction (GFDRR), 
UNDP and the World Bank, while among the bilaterals Denmark, France, 
Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK were seen as the key 
external actors. In addition, a number of international NGOs are actively 
engaging with climate change issues in Mozambique, with some, including Save 
the Children and its partners in the DFID-funded Africa Climate Change 
Resilience Alliance (ACCRA), attempting to translate this into policy influence. 
 
Several of the initiatives supported by external actors involved data collection 
and modelling. Because of Mozambique’s particular vulnerabilities, the country 
has been the subject of a range of innovative analytical studies with regard to 
climate resilience and adaptation. Following the 2000 floods, quite good local 
awareness has been built of the risks posed by extreme weather events and local 
programs such as the internationally renowned “living with floods” approach are 
under way (Sphere Project, 2000). Denmark, GTZ and UNDP funded a study on 
the impact of climate change on disaster risks in Mozambique (2009). The 
GFDRR has funded a study on the Economic Vulnerability and Disaster Risk 
Assessment (2009). The UK, the Netherlands and Switzerland financed a two-
year Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change Study which had Mozambique 
as one of its case studies and included a mapping of agro-ecological zones by 
vulnerability as well as a review of the vulnerability of the hydropower sector. 
The World Bank has also financed a Water Resources Strategy and detailed work 
on the Zambezi basin (2007) and a study on climate risks related to the transport 
sector (TFESSD).  
 
Other internationally-supported initiatives have moved beyond data collection 
and analysis into planning, the key field with which PPCR is designed to engage. 
 
 
INGC and MICOA have recently jointly developed an action plan (called INGC 
phase II, with a budget of US$ 4 million) aiming at: formulating  a national 
strategy to respond to climate change; development of a systematic focus on 
climate change for sectoral policies; revision of the legal framework and 
secondary legislation to adjust fiscal policies; engagement of the private sector in 
adaptation to climate change (through provision of guidelines for mandatory 
adaptation standards and requirements for investors);  and raising awareness at 
national, provincial and district levels. Denmark, UNDP and France have pledged 
money to finance part of the INGC action plan.  
 
INGC and MICOA are also implementing a USD 3 million “Africa Adaptation 
Programme (AAP)”, aiming at the institutional strengthening of the Government 
to manage the climate change agenda, financed by the Japanese Government and 
managed by UNDP. Denmark is also preparing a new environment project with 
MICOA which will have a climate change component. INGC has recently prepared 
a USD 5 million Disaster Risk Management Plan aimed at building policy, 
strategies, and institutions, identifying, assessing and monitoring risks and 
reducing underlying risk factors, which will be financed by the GFDRR. DFID is 
supporting the revision of Mozambique’s NAPA and the development of a 
national climate change strategy. 
 
The analysis of stakeholders and interests involved in the PPCR should therefore 
be understood in the context of this already-crowded field of actors and 
initiatives.  
 
5.2 Stakeholder analysis 
In Table 4 below, we present a summary of the principal institutional players 
involved in the definition of PPCR priorities at the national level, and the 
interests attributed to each of them by key informants consulted for the study. 
 
Table 4: Stakeholders and interests – national level 
Stakeholder Interests identified by key informants 
World Bank  Direct PPCR money to existing project in 
Zambezi Valley 
 Use PPCR money for proposed new 
coastal cities project 
 Impose WB management practices 
(fiduciary requirements, etc.) 
 Build on links with MPD 
 Generate fee revenues from managing 
PPCR funds 
African Development Bank  Direct PPCR money to existing project in 
Limpopo basin 
 Support commercial agriculture and 
heavy irrigation schemes linked to 
Massingir Dam investment 
MICOA  Secure money to support own activities 
 Play lead role in PPCR, decide resource 
 
 
allocation, control implementation unit 
 Ensure technical rather than political 
focus of project  
MPD  Control flow of investments 
 Improve donor coordination 
 Reduce imposition of WB processes 
 Speed up disbursements 
DFID  Strengthen civil society participation in 
Mozambique (complementing existing 
civil society support strategy)  
 Broaden citizen engagement in delivery of 
projects 
 Make WB more accountable for use of 
money going in from UK 
 Strengthen engagement with GoM 
(especially MICOA) 
 Position DFID as key bilateral donor in 
climate change in Mozambique 
UNDP  Strengthen relationship with MICOA  
 Promote strategic role of Africa 
Adaptation Program 
UNAC (National Union of 
Peasants) 
 Support production and produce 
marketing of small farmers (peasants) 
 Protect small farmers’ land rights 
Environmental NGOs (Centro 
Terra Viva, ABIODES, Justiça 
Ambiental) 
 Ensure government compliance with 
environmental legislation 
 Promote information sharing  
 Promote increased consultation over 
environment policy 
Frelimo (ruling party)  Ensure that investments are in line with 
party priorities 
 
Table 5: Stakeholders and interests – Beira and coastal cities component 
Stakeholder Interests identified by key informants 
World Bank  Include Beira in new coastal cities project 
Conselho Municipal da Beira 
(Beira Municipal Administration) 
 Access to funds for administration 
 Access to resources for future election 
campaigns 
 Influence criteria for municipalities’ access 
to funds 
 Increase influence over control and 
management of Beira port  
 Promote political profile of mayor 
 Implement municipal strategic plan 
emphasising coastal protection, economic 
opportunities, health, housing 
 
 
Local governance-oriented NGOs 
(Plataforma de Governação Local) 
 Promote increased consultation before, 
during and after PPCR implementation  
 Create regular forum for consultation in 
Beira 
 Civil society participation in implementation 
 Access to funds 
 Strengthen communication and information 
sharing within civil society 
 Increase direct community engagement in 
activities (from token participation to co-
management) 
Local environmental NGOs (ADEL)  Increase awareness of mangrove 
management model/experience  
 Participate in PPCR implementation 
Port of Beira   Ensure returns to shareholders (80% owned 
by investors linked to President Guebuza) 
 Maintain viability of port as principal export 
channel for Tete coal 
Mining companies (Vale, 
Riversdale) 
 Ensure reliable and economic export 
channel for Tete coal 
Railway company (CFM)  Deliver on agreement with Vale to export 
coal via railway to Beira 
 Avoid having to carry people or their goods 
in addition to coal 
Japanese Government  Provide loans to Beira for coastal protection 
investment  
G19 group of leading donors  Support MDM administration in Beira 
Engineering and construction 
companies 
 Profit from investments in breakwaters, etc. 
Timber traders  Increase access to sources of timber near 
Beira 
Charcoal burners   Access to mangrove or other sources for 
charcoal 
Fishing communities  Preserve mangrove for fish, crab & prawn 
reproduction 
 
A full stakeholder analysis should provide insights into the forms of and levels of 
power and influence exercised by different actors in pursuit of their interests in 
a given negotiation process. However, since Phase 1 of the PPCR is still under 
way at the time of writing the outcome of this process is not yet known, which 
makes it hard to draw definitive conclusions on the relative ability of the 
different actors to deploy the forms of power at their disposal. In particular, the 
decisions on (a) the inclusion of Beira in the PPCR and (b) the choice of strategy 
and technology for increasing the city’s climate resilience if it is included have 
yet to be formalised and made public.  
 
 
 
5.3 Implementation  
As noted above, at the time of writing the PPCR process in Mozambique has yet 
to conclude its Phase 1. Following a further round of negotiations to ensure the 
integration of the different components, the final proposal for Phase 2 
investments is due to be presented at a PPCR Subcommittee Meeting in Cape 
Town at the end of June 2011. 
 
The evidence collected during the study suggests that Beira will be included in 
the Phase 2 proposal, given the weight of both the technical arguments in favour 
of its inclusion and the economic interests involved (including those of the 
Frelimo elite), as well as the power of MDB (and donor) preferences in shaping 
investment patterns in Mozambique. However, it is highly likely that conditions 
will be imposed by the central government that either limit the scope for Mayor 
Daviz Simango to control the PPCR investments in Beira, or ensure a mutually 
advantageous sharing of the political and economic benefits. 
 
On the choice of strategy and technology, both the local administration and the 
MDBs seem to be open to considering a range of options with broader 
environmental and livelihood benefits (including mangrove restoration and tree-
planting for dune stabilisation). However, these are unlikely to play more than a 
marginal role, given the weight of the incentives to emphasise heavy engineering 
solutions and the limited evidence that these actors are seriously committed to 
involving either communities themselves or local civil society groups with 
relevant expertise and experience in the PPCR design and decision-making 
process. 
 
On the question of stakeholder engagement and civil society participation, some 
progress seems to have occurred since the conclusion of the fieldwork phase of 
this study and the presentation of the initial findings to a group of civil society 
and donor agency representatives in Maputo in October 2010. As noted in 
Section 4.3 above, pressure from bilateral donor representatives on the MDBs 
has been relayed to the recently-appointed Government of Mozambique focal 
points, who have launched a series of consultation meetings. At least one donor 
representative is optimistic that Phase 2 will include greater participation, since 
this process has increased government awareness of “the need for involving in 
practice other sectors such as civil society and the private sector”. 
 
Beyond the specific case of Mozambique, there is evidence that the MDBs are 
responding to criticism of the limited scope within PPCR Phase 1 activities for 
“broad participation”. The agenda document for the PPCR pilot country meeting 
that will take place before the Subcommittee Meeting in Cape Town in June 2011 
explicitly highlights the need for discussion of “how an active engagement of the 
civil society could enhance the effectiveness of SPCRs and extend its 
boundaries”.8 
                                                        
8
 Document available at 
http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/sites/climateinvestmentfunds.org/files/PPCR_program_gui
de_6_2011_Draft.pdf  
 
 
6. Conclusions and Recommendations 
This study has concluded that there is little evidence that the PPCR Phase 1 
process in Mozambique has fulfilled the stated aspiration of the programme to 
ensure “broad participation that promotes country ownership of the PPCR 
program and its implementation as well as partnerships among the government, 
national stakeholders, and development partners” (CIF 2009b: 4). 
 
Our political economy analysis has highlighted a number of factors that have 
combined to undermine this aspiration’s chances of fulfilment. Some of these 
factors relate to broader issues of ideology that shape the conceptualisation of 
the programme. These include the restrictive framing of the key issues to be 
decided in PPCR Phase 1 as those prioritised by the “managerialist” ideology of 
the World Bank, and the exclusion from discussion of alternative local resilience 
strategies by the “developmentalist” ideology that is shared by the Government 
of Mozambique and many other actors. Other factors relate to the economic, 
institutional and political incentives that drive decision-making. In the case of 
Mozambique’s PPCR, these are apparent both in the MDBs’ emphasis on the need 
to prioritise regions where they have existing investments and in the 
government’s reluctance to confirm that Phase 2 resources will be allocated to 
the high-priority but opposition-controlled city of Beira.  
 
In the case of stakeholder participation, ideology and incentives combine. On the 
ideological side, dominant framings of “climate resilience” as a highly technical 
issue which needs to be addressed through a combination of large-scale 
investments, expert analysis and high-level planning interventions militates 
against the opening up of meaningful space for dialogue with stakeholders who 
are associated with more experiential knowledge and less capital- and 
technology-intensive climate resilience strategies – such as the poor and 
vulnerable Mozambican citizens who are struggling to adapt to climate change, 
and the local civil society groups who are working with them in sites such as the 
mangrove forests around Beira. On the incentives side, the drive for rapid 
disbursement of PPCR funds increases the reluctance of the MDBs to invest in 
potentially complex and time-consuming consultation processes, while the 
pervasive lack of trust between government and civil society provides little 
incentive for either side to invest scarce institutional and political resources in 
engaging with such processes. 
 
In the light of these findings, we recommend that those responsible for the PPCR 
process at the international level should make an explicit choice: either the 
programme should abandon its exaggerated claims to be promoting “country 
ownership” and “stakeholder participation”, or it should make a meaningful 
commitment of time and resources to ensuring that these claims can acquire 
some substance. If they choose the latter option, then clear guidance should be 
produced and ring-fenced funding should be allocated to ensuring that 
participation in Phase 2 can genuinely influence the detailed design of PPCR 
investments, albeit recognising that their sectoral and geographical focus has 
already been largely determined by a Phase 1 process that – at least in 
Mozambique – has proved to be rather less than fully participatory and country-
owned.  
 
 
In Mozambique there is evident government reluctance to involve civil society 
groups – let alone citizens themselves – in decision-making around large-scale 
investments. In such contexts, bringing the principles of “country ownership” 
and “stakeholder participation” together will require the PPCR to adopt a 
broader definition of “country ownership”, rather than allowing it to become 
conflated with “government control”. 
 
This can be achieved by simultaneously strengthening and reorienting the 
PPCR’s focus on the national planning process. The programme could provide a 
vehicle for technical, financial and political support by donors and MDBs for 
broader engagement in national planning for climate resilience – rather than the 
current narrow focus on technical capacity building within planning 
departments such as Mozambique’s MPD. The international actors associated 
with the PPCR could use their influence to build links between currently 
disconnected segments (government, private sector, civil society organisations, 
different groups of citizens) and levels (local, regional, national, international), as 
well as different government departments. This should include specific support 
for strengthening communication and coordination among civil society groups, 
given this study’s findings on the difficulties faced by existing NGO networks and 
platforms in engaging with grassroots constituencies and then ensuring that 
information is shared and joint positions are negotiated prior to engagements 
with government and donor agencies. International actors could also make a 
greater effort to ensure that PPCR investments are aligned with existing 
government and joint donor/government planning frameworks, which in 
Mozambique’s case include the Five-Year Plan (PQG) and the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (PARP). 
 
This approach could promote a genuinely “transformational shift” that could 
“strengthen capacities at the national levels to integrate climate resilience into 
development planning” (CIF 2009a, p. 1). Because it would involve not only the 
addition of new technical content for climate resilient development planning but 
also the adoption of new principles and practices for ensuring broader 
engagement in the national planning process as a whole, this approach could 
help to bring about the “transformational shift” that is needed in the quality of 
responses to the whole range of climate and development challenges that 
countries such as Mozambique are currently facing. 
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List of project workshop participants 
Participants in Beira Workshop – 13
th
 October 2010, Hotel Moçambique 
 Name Institution Contacts 
1 Amélia Meço AJULSID 827700097 – 
ammeco.meco29@gmail.com 
2 Herculana José ADEC 823495322 – 
herculanasande@yahoo.com.br 
3 Artur Raúl Correia TRIMODER 827765149 – 
raulcorreia33@yahoo.com.br 
4 José Coelho GTZ-PD Sofala 823900022 – 
Jorge.coelho@gtz.de 
5 Mário Barbito Partido Renamo 825692950 – 
mbarbito@gmail.com 
6 José Monteiro FOPROSA 824325865 
7 Feliciano Matique AMACO 823828590 – 
amacobeira@gmail.com 
8 Nazarete Reginaldo LDH 824031600 – 
nazaregina@yahoo.com.br 
9 Aristides Armando Plataforma de G. Local 847714182 – 
aristidesarmando@yahoo.com.br 
10 Víctor Nhamue AEUP 824460015 
11 Caetano Santiago KULIMA 826122199 – 
caetano.santiago@yahoo.com.br 
12 Matilde Baule Cunhaque MONASO 824112990 – 
mpechem@yahoo.com.br 
13 Michele Ghelli Cooperação Italiana 823514469 
14 Ilda Lourenço Rádio Moçambique 848230906 
15 Ravy Serra ADEL Sofala 822529070 – 
ravy@adelaofala.co.mz 
16 Américo Nsopela UniZambeze Sofala 829930822 
17 Emerson Damião AJV - Sofala 825467766 – 
damiao.emerson@gmail.com 
18 Eugénio Armando G20 Sofala 829195100 
19 Ilídio Tinga AMOPROC 828147332/825712180 – 
agritinga@yahoo.com.br 
20 Francisco Majoi CMunicipal Beira 845885544 
21 Nelito Lucas Conselho Cristão de M 825855180 – 
nelitolucas47@hotmail.com 
22 Teodoro Cassamo DPCA/MICOA Sofala 828605370 – 
teorodorocassamo@yahoo.co.mz 
23 Mariana Lumisa Dias AMODE 823827540 
24 Elias António Sitole AJOCHI 825877230 
 
 
25 Jeremias Moura ORAM 847704513 – 
jeremiasumoura@yahoo.com.br 
26 Helena J.A. Alexandre AMODE 829116871 
27 Augusto de Jesus Conselho Municipal da Beira 
(CMB) 
825506330 
28 Mário José G. CMB/ Direcção do Planeamento 
Físico 
824388940 
29 Augusto Paulo CMB/ Dep. Gestão Ambiental 825812550 – 
bagigeam@gmail.com 
30 Ana Manuel AMODE 827862920 
31 Carlos Neto Ngalo AMODE 828644340 – 
nelsonngalo@yahoo.com.br 
32 Júlio Alberto Manta AMODE 829146872 
33 José Gundana AMODE 823878710 gundana@gmail.com 
34 Hamid Kylso ADEL adelsofala@tdm.co.mz 
Participants in Maputo workshop – 14
th
 October 2010, Kaya Kwanga 
 Name Institution Contacts 
1 Artur Matavele WATERAID 82/84 -3104060 – 
arturmatavele@wateraid.org 
2 Mário Basílio CARE 82/84-5222834 – 
mariojorgebasilio@gmail.com/ 
Mario_b@inam.gov.mz 
3 Cláudio João World Vision 823166840 
4 Rita Zacarias DFID 843001392 r-
zacarias@dfid.gov.uk 
5 Clara Landeiro UNDP 820682029 - 
clara.landeiro@undp.org 
6 Juan Lopez SIDA 829032337 – 
juan.lopez@yourenvironment.net 
7 Ravy Serra ADEL Sofala 822529070 
8 Daviz Simango CMB +258 23 329709 - 
usimango@gmail.com 
9 Nazarete Reginaldo LDH Beira  
10 José Luis Gundana Plataforma Governação Sofala  
11 Jerónimo Tovela WFP/ PMA 823185960 – 
jeronimo.tovela@wfp.org 
12 Adelaide Ferreira Agência Francesa de 
Desenvolvimento 
ferreiraa@afd.fr 
13 Karen Colin de Verdiere Agência Francesa de 
Desenvolvimento 
 
14 Diamantino Nhampossa UNAC 824904050 
15 Carmen Munhequete UNDP 824859070 
16 Aeroplano Francisco Centro Terra Viva (CTV) 825680230 - 
franciscoaeroplano@gmail.com 
17 Jean-Christophe Carret World Bank jccarret@worldbank.org 
 
 
